In a randomized field experiment where first year university students could earn financial rewards for passing the first year requirements within one year we find small and non-significant average effects of financial incentives on the pass rate and the numbers of collected credit points. There is however evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects. In particular, in the first year high ability students have higher pass rates and collect significantly more credit points when assigned to (higher) reward groups. Low ability students collect less credit points when assigned to higher reward groups. After three years these effects have increased, suggesting dynamic spillovers. The small average effect is therefore the sum of a positive effect of high ability students and a (partly) off-setting negative effect for low ability students. A negative effect of financial incentives for less "capitalized" individuals is in line with research from psychology and recent economic laboratory experiments which shows that external rewards may be detrimental for intrinsic motivation.
Introduction
Recently, there is increased interest in the effectiveness of financial incentives for students to increase their achievement (e.g. Angrist and Lavy 2002; Dearden et al. 2002; Kremer et al. 2004 ). This interest is in part fed by the impression that spending money to increase education inputs is a relatively ineffective way to improve student outcomes (Hanushek 1986 (Hanushek , 1996 Hoxby 2000) .
Although economic theory predicts a positive relation between financial incentives and effort, there is little empirical evidence that shows that financial incentives are indeed an effective way to improve student outcomes. While there is evidence that financial incentives can work in some contexts, there is also a large literature in psychology and experimental economics that draws the attention to potential adverse effects of incentives. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) review 74 studies where subjects were paid zero, low or high financial rewards. The effects of incentives on performance in these studies are mixed and complicated. Camerer and Hogarth point to two important results that arise from this literature: the importance of intrinsic motivation, and the nature of the match of what they refer to as "production" (the characteristics of the task at hand) and "capital" (the cognitive skills of the subjects).
1 They conclude that (i) capital variables such as educational background, general intelligence and experience may interact with incentives, (ii) poorly capitalized individuals may perform worse, and (iii) there are potentially interaction effects between capital and production which can result in so-called "floor effects" (when tasks are feasible for many) or "ceiling effects" (when task are feasible for few).
The effect of financial incentives in general, and the effect of financial incentives in education in particular is therefore an empirical question. This paper studies the effect of financial incentives on achievement and effort by means of a randomized field experiment among first year undergraduate students in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam who started in the academic year 2000/2001. The experimental design was such that freshmen were randomly assigned to three groups. Students assigned to a high reward group could earn a bonus of €681 on completion of all first year requirements by the start of the new academic year. Students assigned to a low reward group could earn a €227 bonus for this achievement. Students who were assigned to the control group could not earn a reward. The design with both a low and a high reward allows us to separate the effect of receiving a financial reward from the effect of the size of the reward. This distinction is potentially important because it has been found that rewards may affect performance in a non-monotonic fashion. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) found that where substantial rewards improve performance, small rewards may actually deteriorate achievement.
In previous years -without financial incentives -the first year pass rate among students in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam was in the vicinity of 20 percent. Such low pass rates are not uncommon in continental European countries and can be attributed to an institutional arrangement in which universities are publicly funded and where tuition fees are low or non-existing. As a consequence, students are not confronted with appropriate prices and spend more time in the system than the nominal duration of their studies.
For society, delay imposes a cost in the form of extra expenditures on education and the foregone productivity of the students. The university has a (short term) incentive to increase the pass rate since public funding depends partly on the number of credits points awarded each year. The university has also other reasons to address the delay of students: teaching becomes more difficult because not all students are on schedule, the failing and re-doing of exams also implies more crowded classrooms and more grading. Moreover, once a year a ranking of university departments in each field is published which is aimed at secondary education students who are in the process of choosing their university education. The first year pass rate is one of the inputs of this ranking.
To evaluate the effectives of the reward scheme we not only consider the pass rate and the number of collected credits points in the year that the reward scheme was in place, but also look a longer term outcomes. Although the experiment's incentive scheme only rewards achievement in the first year, there may be long term effects. Students who are successful in their first year could continue to be diligent during the rest of their study. In this case both short term and long term effects would be positive, with the long term effects exceeding the short term effects. It could also be that students in the reward groups increase their effort (and achievement) during the first year, but reduce their effort in subsequent years. This would result in a positive short term effect and a zero long term effect. To investigate the long term effects, we estimate the effects of the rewards on the number of credit points collected after three years, and the dropout rate after three years.
To briefly summarize our results, for the full sample we find a small and non-significant positive effect of the high reward on achievement, both measured by pass rates and numbers of collected credit points. We find evidence for the importance of the effects highlighted by Camerer and Hogarth. In particular, high ability students (those with more "capital") have higher pass rates and collect significantly more credit points when assigned to (higher) reward groups. Low ability students on the other hand appear to achieve less when assigned to the high reward group.
While at the end of the first year these effects are only significant for the high ability group, after three years the sizes of the effects has increased and are statistically significant for both the low and high ability group. The average treatment effect is therefore small and non-significant not because all students are unresponsive to financial incentives, but because it is an average of a positive effect at the upper end of the ability distribution and a negative effect at the bottom.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses the related literature. Section 3 provides relevant background information about the Dutch system of higher education and of the economics and business program at the University of Amsterdam. Section 4 explains the design of the field experiment and describes the data. Section 5 presents and discusses the results for the whole population. Section 6 investigates the behavioral heterogeneity mentioned in the previous paragraph, and discusses the interpretation of these findings.
Section 7 discusses potential threats to the validity of the experiment such as substitution bias, manipulation by teachers, and externalities, and concludes that these are unlikely to affect our conclusions. Section 8 summarizes our findings and discusses the implications of the results.
Evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives in education
There is relatively little evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives in the context of educational production, and in particular on how students respond to financial rewards. Angrist and Lavy (2002) analyze the effects of financial rewards on students' achievement in an experimental setting. 2 They evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives that reward secondary education matriculation in Israel. Angrist and Lavy implemented two experiments targeted at low-achieving students. Their first (pilot) experiment randomized 489 students within schools, where 248 students were assigned to the treatment group. Treated students could earn a reward of $800 in cash (or $1000 to $1200 in education vouchers) on com-2 The first draft of their study circulated only after our experiment started.
pletion of their secondary education matriculation certificate. To obtain the support of school administrators, the randomization favored potentially low-achieving students toward the treatment group. Using instrumental variables estimation, Angrist and Lavy do not find a significant effect of the reward on achievement.
Their second (follow-up) experiment is a school-based experiment in which 20 out of 40 entire schools (with low matriculation rates) are assigned to treatment.
According to the original design, students in treated schools could earn up to $2500 in cash over a three-year period. The program was however abolished after one year. As a result students in grades 10 and 11 could earn at most $500 and students in grade 12 at most $1500. Angrist and Lavy (2002) find that treated schools have 6-8 percentage points higher matriculation rates than untreated schools.
Recently, Kremer et al. (2004) analyze the effects of financial rewards on achievement for primary school girls in rural Kenya by means of a randomized experiment. Girls in grade 6 who received the treatment could earn a reward worth $38 if they would end up in the top 15 percent of the test score distribution. The experiment was conducted in two districts in western Kenya (Busia and Teso). Kremer et al. report large positive effects on both achievement and school attendance in one district (Busia), whereas there appear to be no such effects in the other district (Teso). Furthermore, the results point to the presence of externalities. Boys (who were ineligible), and girls with low initial achievement (who were unlikely to earn a reward), also experienced higher test scores and school attendance in Busia.
The spillovers are almost complete: boys and initially low achieving girls benefit as much as initially high achieving girls.
While not all results from these studies point in the same direction, on balance they support the case that financial incentives have positive effects on achievement.
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Background
University education in the Netherlands is accessible for all students with a qualification from the pre-university track in secondary education. 4 This secondary education qualification can only be obtained by passing a uniform nationwide exam.
The relevant secondary education exit requirements are set such that they are considered to be sufficient university entry requirements, and therefore all students starting a university education in economics or business are supposed to be capable of actually graduating (given that they exert sufficient effort).
In the academic year 2001/2002 there were 34,200 first year students at Dutch universities, which is about 17 percent of the relevant birth cohort. Some university studies (such as economics, history or mathematics) may require specific courses to be included in the secondary education curriculum. Apart from this, universities
are not permitted to select students; everyone who applies with a valid entry qualification has to be admitted. 5 In the Netherlands selection therefore takes place at the exit of secondary education as opposed to at the entry of higher education.
Currently, six Dutch universities offer an undergraduate program in economics and business. 6 While there are small differences between the programs offered by these universities, they are considered to be close substitutes. Not only do they attract students from the same pool of secondary school graduates, but they prepare their students for the same labor market, although people tend to stay in their region of origin. Oosterbeek et al. (1992) compare the labor market outcomes of graduates from the different economics and business departments in the Netherlands and find that selection corrected wage differentials are modest.
University students in the Netherlands who are younger than 30 and subscribed as full-time students are all charged the same tuition fee (about €1,300 in the academic year 2001/2002) . The tuition fee is set by the government and does not vary by field of study or by university. There is also a uniform financial aid system that applies to all university students. The financial aid scheme consists of three components that students are entitled to for a maximum of four years. The first component is a basic grant of €211 per month for students who do not live with their parents and €69 per month for those students who do. The second compo-4 Students who successfully completed the first year in a higher vocational school can also enter university. These students are a small fraction of the total inflow into university.
5 For a few studies students are admitted on the basis of a lottery when the number of applicants exceeds the number of available places. This is not the case for the economics and business studies. An important feature of the basic grant and the additional grant is that they become loans if a student fails to collect enough credit points. Grants received during the first study year are not transformed into a loan if the student earns at least half of the nominal number of credit points of the first year or if the student obtains a higher education diploma within 10 years. The requirements for the grants not to turn into a loan are therefore not very demanding. In our population of economics students 58% (see below) collects at least half of the credit points.
Furthermore, of a given cohort of students over 80% will actually graduate within 10 years. The financial aid system of the government does not interfere with our financial rewards since the financial rewards in the experiment are only paid if a student collects all credit points.
The complete loan plus interest (from the month of payment onward) must be repaid within 17 years after graduation. People with annual earnings below a certain threshold are exempted from repayment. Otherwise repayment is in fixed amounts independent of income. The loan component of the financial aid scheme is not very popular among Dutch students. Students typically use the basic grant and the additional grant, but of the total amount available for loans less than 20 percent is requested. This is reflected in the fact that many university students combine studying with some hours of paid work. In our sample around 80 percent of the students work, and they work on average around 12 hours per week (details concerning data collection are provided later).
The undergraduate program in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam is a 4 year program. In the first academic year, which runs from September until August, all students in economics and business follow exactly the same program of 14 compulsory courses. The first year program was divided into three terms of 14 weeks each in the year that the experiment was conducted.
It is important to note that, since the program is fixed, students cannot substitute easy for difficult courses. Every term ended with exams shortly after the courses finished and the make-up exams are organized in the last week of August. The first academic year thus consisted of 42 study weeks, which are allotted to different courses in the form of 60 credit points.
7 It is only after the first term of their sec-7 Table A1 in the appendix gives an overview of the first year courses and the number of credit points assigned to each course. ond academic year that students choose different packages of courses to specialize either in economics or in business (there are also various sub-specializations within economics and within business)
Experimental design and data
Design
We randomized first year students in three groups; a control group, a high reward group and a low reward group. The reward sizes of the high and low reward groups are €681 and €227.
In previous years -without financial incentives -the first year pass rate among students in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam is in the vicinity of 20 percent. At the beginning of the third trimester in the academic year 1999/2000 the dean of the economics department therefore decided to promise all undergraduate econometrics freshmen a reward of €454 (1000 Dutch guilders) upon fulfilling all first year requirements before the start of the next academic year. 8 In the year that this reward was in place the pass rate was 0.50 compared to 0.28 in the previous year (cf . Hilkhuysen 2000) . 9 Given the substantial increase in the pass rate attributed to the €454 reward, the rewards in the present experiment seem sufficiently large to increase pass rates.
Our design provides strong incentives in terms of purchasing power also compared to Kremer et al. (2004) . Whereas the available reward per student in their experiment in Kenya was $5.7 (0.15*38), which is equivalent to 0.6 percent of GDP per capita in Kenya, in our study the available reward per student is €681 (in the high reward group) which is equivalent to 2.4 percent of GDP per capita. 10 The size of these rewards is such that it would be feasible for the government or the university to implement the reward scheme if indeed the rewards result in higher pass rates and/or more realized credit points.
An important feature of our design is the distinction between a high and a low reward. This potentially allows us to distinguish between the effect of being treated as such, and the effect of the size of the reward (and investigate the presence of potential disincentive effects of financial rewards as in, for example, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000) .
To ensure that all students were treated identically, participation in the experiment was only open to students who (i) followed the full-time program, (ii) did not claim more than 1 credit point dispensation, 11 and (iii) did not start the economics and business program in a previous year. The total number of eligible students equals 254.
Participation in the experiment was on a voluntary basis. On October 1 2001, almost one month after classes started, we sent all first year students a letter inviting them to participate in the experiment. This was the earliest possible date given the availability of addresses from the student administration. The letter explained the purpose of the experiment and informed students that participants would be randomly assigned to three equally sized groups with equal odds for all students.
Furthermore the letter explained that participation implied that the student granted the researchers permission to link information from the experiment to information from the student records about their achievements. Students received a fixed payment of €22.69 (50 Dutch guilders) after having returned a completely filled out participation form which included a small questionnaire. Notice that this procedure reveals clearly that no participant looses from the experiment. Everyone receives a small payment and everyone faces equal probabilities to be assigned to one of the reward groups. After a reminder and a telephone round, 249 eligible students participated in the experiment which is 98% of all eligible students. Three students could not be reached and 2 students explicitly rejected participation.
In the random assignment 83 students were assigned to the high reward group, 84 students to the low reward group, and 82 students to the control group. On
November 29, letters were sent informing participants about their assignment status. The first exam of the first term was on November 28, the others in December.
The exams of the second and third term took place in March/April and June/July respectively. The re-exams were held in August.
11 Students can receive 1 credit point dispensation for part of the financial accounting course if they followed a specific course during secondary education.
Data from questionnaire
The short questionnaire, filled out at the moment of registration for particiaption, collected information on respondents' mathematics grades in secondary school and their parents' education. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the background characteristics of the complete sample and for the three different reward groups. Parental education is reported in years. Dutch pre-university secondary education offers two programs in mathematics: mathematics A and mathematics B. Mathematics A is considerably less advanced than mathematics B. Students are allowed to do exams in both programs, but it is not compulsory to do mathematics A in order to do mathematics B. In practice the better students choose mathematics B. Apart from the average grades on the math exams, table 1 also reports the shares of students who did not do the exam for mathematics A, or mathematics B. Recall that exams are graded on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). The random assignment was done by stratifying the participants on the basis of their mathematics results and their parents' education. This precludes that the random assignment procedure accidentally results in groups that differ in these observed characteristics. Table 1 shows that the randomization balances the characteristics well between the treatment and control groups. We will control for these background variables in our analysis.
The pre-assignment questionnaire also asked participants their subjective probability of fulfilling the requirement of passing all exams within the first academic year if they would be assigned to the control group, the low reward group and the high reward group respectively. This was done to get some indication of the anticipated effect of the rewards before the experiment actually took place. The average expected probabilities are reported in the bottom part of Table 1 . Without a reward the expected pass rate equals 0.55. Given that the actual pass rates in previous years were around 0.20, students seem overly optimistic at the beginning of their study.
If students would be entitled to the low reward the expected pass rate increases to 0.63, and it increases to 0.71 for the high reward. This implies that ex-ante the students themselves expected quite sizable effects from the rewards. No differences are observed across groups. Conditional on ability, proxied by the available math grades, the self-assessed pass probability for the control treatment could be interpreted as a measure of intrinsic motivation. We will add this as a control variable in the analyses.
After the experiment ended a second questionnaire was sent to all participants.
Upon completion, students received a payment of €25. In total 234 participants (5)- (7) are from standard t-tests.
responded, which is 94% of all participants. This post-experiment questionnaire asked questions concerning the time students spent on their studies during the past year, their work activities during the past study year, and possible supplementary rewards offered by third parties. We discuss the results and findings based on these data in sections 5 to 7.
Results
Achievement
We report the impact estimates on a number of outcome variables. First we look at the first year pass rate since the bonus was tied to collecting all 60 credit points.
Moreover, we consider the number of credit points students collected in the first year. As mentioned above, we also look at the longer term impacts of the financial rewards, namely the number of credit points in achieved after 3 years, and whether the student dropped out by this time.
For each outcome variable we first report the raw means and standard deviations for every treatment (and control) group. We estimate regressions of the form
where D L i equals one if student i was in the low reward group, and zero otherwise, D H i is a corresponding indicator variable for the high reward group. Finally, we report estimates with and without a set of control variables x i . We include these to correct for remaining differences between the different treatment groups and reduce the residual variation in order to improve the precision of our effect estimates.
Column (1) in table 2 shows the average pass rates for the different groups.
The pass rate increases monotonically with the size of the reward from 0.195 in the control group to 0.241 in the high reward group. The second column shows the results from the regression without controls. The coefficients are the difference with respect to the control group which is the reference category, and p-values from standard t-tests are reported in the lower part of table 2. Although the pass rate increases with reward size the differences are not statistically significant. Although it cannot be rejected that the size of the effect is the same for the low and the high reward, the pooled estimate (not reported) is also insigificant with a p-value of 0.368. Column (3) adds controls to the regression in the second column. The point estimates increase somewhat and the standard errors are reduced, the final estimate of the effect of the high reward 0.055 and 0.033 for the low reward. Again, these differences are not statistically significant.
Columns (4)- (6) report the results for the number of credit points by the end of the first year. Students in the control group earn on average 33.2 credit points.
This number is lower in the treatment groups where students collect on average less credit points. After adding regressors the negative impact estimates attenuate somewhat and standard errors decrease, but the pattern remains the same.
Columns (7)- (9) report the total number of credit points achieved by the end of the third year for every treatment group. The picture here is roughly the same as after one year, small positive or negative differences between the treatment groups and the control groups, none of which is remotely significant. Finally, columns (10)- (12) report the fraction of students that dropped out of economics after three years. Students in the treatment groups are more likely to be still enrolled after three years than the students in the control group. Again these effects are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Interestingly the point estimates on the number of credit points, both after 1 year and after 3 years, and the drop-out rate are not monotonic. Students in the low reward group perform uniformly worse than students in the control group, and students in the high reward group perform uniformly better than students in the low reward group. This is a similar pattern as in the study by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) who find that low rewards can have disincentive effects. The fact that the average pass rates do increase monotonically with the reward size suggests that the effects of the rewards are not uniform across the credit point distribution and possibly different for different subjects.
To investigate this further, figure 1 shows the cumulative distributions of the number of achieved credit points for each of the three reward groups after one year, and after three years. Although the three distributions are very similar after 1 year, students in the treatment groups are more often at the bottom and at the top of the credit point distribution. This explains why we observe a monotonic effect of reward size on the pass rate together with a non-monotonic (negative) impact on the number of credits points. The p-value of a chi-square test for equality of the distributions equals 0.97, indicating that by the end of the first year there are no significant differences between the distributions of credit points of the different groups. For the number of credit points collected after 3 years the cumulative density function of the treatment groups are very similar. That students in the reward groups perform better at the top of the credit point distribution can be explained by the fact that the reward was explicitly tied to the pass rate. This is also consistent with the fact that the effect at the top is only observed in the first year, when the reward was in place, and not after three years.
It is more difficult to explain the poorer performance of students in the low and high reward groups at the bottom of the distribution. One explanation could be an interaction effect between the financial reward and student ability (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999) . If there are ceiling effects, then low ability students might perceive the threshold of the 60 credits points necessary to collect the reward as infeasible. The financial reward would not have an incentive effect for this group.
If in addition the external reward displaces intrinsic motivation of students (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) , then financial incentives would deteriorate the performance of low ability students. High ability students on the other hand, might judge the requirement of the reward as feasible and increase their effort. We explore this further in section 6.
Although the results suggest that the average effect of the financial incentives on the pass rate after one year are at most modest, the point estimates in table 2 are not very precisely estimated. Another way to bound the average effect of the bonus on pass rates is the following. From column (6) in table 2 we know with 95% probability that the effect of the low reward on the number of credits points is at most 5.3 points (=-0.535+1.96*2.987), and 5.7 points for the high reward (-0.122+1.96*2.994). If we add 5.7 credit points to the number of credits points of the students in the control group, their pass rate increases from 0.195 to 0.256. This gives us an alternative upper bound of 0.061 on the pass rate, a number that is very close to the point estimate in column (3) of table 2. This increases our confidence that the average effect is at most fairly modest. Especially when compared to the previous non-experimental study which found an effect of 0.22 for a reward which was 33 percent lower than the high reward in the present experiment.
Effort and time allocation
We collected information about students' effort levels to examine whether the rewards had an impact on effort. The effect of rewards on achievement is a reduced form effect. It does not disentangle the effects of rewards on effort and subsequently of effort on achievement. Even if effects on achievement are zero or small, we cannot rule out that students increased their effort. The post-experiment questionnaire included the following questions:
• "How many hours per week did you on average spend on your study in economics and business during each of the three trimesters of the past academic year (2001/2002)? (We want to know the total average time spent on your study, this means including following and preparing lectures and courses and preparing exams.)"
• "How many hours did you spend in total on preparing make-up exams held in August? (Here we want to know the total number of hours, not the average per week.)" Information on study time is provided in the first block of Table 3 .
Average study time in the control group is around 23.6 hours per week during the first trimester and decreases to about 19 during the second trimester and 17 during the third trimester. Students in the control group spend on average 29.5 hours to prepare their make-up exams during the summer. Quite a few students report that they do not spend time at all on their study, which influences the averages for the second and third trimesters and for the summer period. These are the students who dropped out and, for the summer period, also students who did no make-up exams.
12 Students in the treatment groups tend to spend slightly less time on their study, but average time spent on the study is very similar across groups.
Differences across groups are neither substantial nor statistically significant.
The questions about study time measure actual effort only imperfectly. The responses are subjective and retrospective, and only measure time input and not the effective input per hour. While biases due to this may cancel out in across group comparisons, it is desirable to have additional information about study effort. The questionnaire therefore also included items concerning time spent on paid work, whether respondents joined a student association and whether they lived with their parents. Results are also reported in Table 3 .
Columns (6)- (8) show that 76 percent of the students in the control group combine studying with work, and those who work spend around 12.5 hours per week on this activity while earning on average €7.69 per hour. Here, we see no differences between the reward and control groups with the exception that students in the high reward group tend to earn somewhat lower wage rates than students in the other two groups. Finally, the last two columns of Table 3 reveal that the rewards 12 In the first trimester 3 respondents report zero study effort, in the second trimester this equals 33 and in the third trimester 39; 83 students spent zero hours on preparing for the August make-up exams, of which 22 students did not have to do any make-up exams. For the sample reporting positive numbers, the distribution of study time is bell-shaped. did not prevent students from joining a student association or from moving out of their parents' house.
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To summarize, we find no differences between groups in reported study time and other time allocation variables. This result is consistent with the first finding that rewards do not affect achievement by a significant margin.
14
Heterogenous treatment effects
In the previous section we found indications for both non-monotonic effects of the size of the rewards, and differential impacts of the reward across the outcome distribution. There are good reasons to expect that some students will be more responsive to a reward than others because of heterogeneity in the marginal cost of effort or heterogeneity in returns. Given the performance threshold attached to the reward, high ability students have to bridge a smaller gap than low ability students because the former collect more credit points in the first place. This introduces an implicit participation constraint which could be binding for low ability students.
In addition, high ability students probably earn more extra credits points than low ability students for a given increase of effort. Consequently, high ability students are more likely to respond to the rewards than low ability students.
In this section we explore this further by looking at the interaction between the rewards and student ability. To do so, we construct an ability index based on students' high school math grades. Students could matriculate in two types of math. As noted in section 4.2, type B math is considerably more advanced than type A math. The better students enroll in math B and often (40 percent) take math A on the side. Of those who do, the math A grade is on average 1.5 points higher than the math B grade. We therefore take ability as the maximum of the student's math B grade and math A grade minus 1.5.
As a robustness check we also performed the analysis in this section using an alternative ability index, namely the grade of the first math exam of the first year (which was held before the students learned their treatment status, but after the announcement of the experiment). The drawback of this variable is that 20 percent 13 Adding controls to the analysis, as reported in table A2, does not change the differences between the control and reward groups.
14 If the rewards would have increased students' study time then we would have been able to estimate the causal effect of study time on achievement. Since the rewards do not change study time we cannot estimate such an effect. Regressing the pass rate on study time we find that one hour study time extra per week is associated with a one percent higher pass rate. Adding controls for ability, social background and the subjective pass rate does not change the size of this correlation. of the students did not make this exam on the first occassion. For this reason we present the results based on the high school math grades in this section. The results of the analysis based on the subsample of students with a non-missing math grade are very similar to the ones presented in the text and therefore make us confident that they are not chance effects.
Before presenting our estimation results, we first look at the raw data and proceed by splitting the sample in two: students of high (above average) ability and students of low (below average) ability. A student is assigned to the high ability group if he scores at least six on the index which implies at least a sufficient grade (6) on the math B exam, otherwise a student is assigned to the low ability group.
This results in 100 students in the high ability group and 149 students in the low ability group.
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Figure 2 shows, stratified by this ability grouping, the cumulative distribution functions of the number of credit points achieved after 1 and 3 years for the three reward groups. The two top panels show the outcome distributions for the high ability students, whereas the two bottom panels show them for the low ability students. It is immediately apparent from the graph that for the high ability students the outcome distribution for the high reward group stochastically dominates the distributions of the other two groups. For the low ability students we observe the opposite, here the distribution for the high reward group is stochastically dominated by the outcome distrubution for the lower rewards groups. The high reward has therefore a positive incentive effect at the top of the ability distribution, and a negative effect at the bottom of the ability distribution. The ordering of the distributions seems to be monotonic with reward size, with the order reversed at the bottom of the ability distribution. This is especially apparent after 3 years. 16 We estimated the following regression to estimate how the treatment effects vary with ability
15 Splitting the sample exactly in two is not possible because of the discreteness of the math grades. We also performed a principal component analysis of the math grades and the math indicator variables. Splitting the sample in two based on the first two scores did not change the conclusions. 16 We also calculated two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests. For the low ability group we find that with probability 0.165 the credit point distribution in 2004 is the same for the control group and the high reward group. For the high ability group the p-value on the test is 0.146. These tests are of course conservative, and do not control for covariates. Regressions without controls give similar results, see table A3.
Credit Points
Proportion <= x where A i equals one for high ability students. As above, D L i is a treatment indicator for the low reward group, and D H i is a corresponding indicator variable for the high reward group. Finally, x i is a set of control variables, and y i the outcome variable. To illustrate the interpretation of the coefficients with this specification, δ L gives the main (intercept) effect of the low reward, and δ A L traces the effect of the low reward for different levels of ability (1 point on a ten point scale). The effect of a low reward for a student who scored a 10 (the highest possible score) on his high school math exam is then δ L + 10 * δ A L , whereas the effect for a low ability student who scored a 2 equals δ L + 2 * δ A L . Table 4 reports the effect estimates for low and high ability students relative to students in relevant control group. The first thing to note about table 4 is that there is now a monotonic relation between the size of the reward and the impact estimate on all outcome variables. For high ability students achievement improves with reward size, whereas for low ability students achievement deteriorates with the size of the reward. The average effects found above are therefore an average of negative effects at the bottom of the skill distribution, and positive effects at the top of the skill distribution. This not only explains the modest effects we found above, when negative and posititive effects approximately cancel out, but is also is the source of the non-monotonic relationship between reward size and credit points observed in table 2.
Column (1) shows the results for the first year pass rate, the outcome to which the reward was tied. At the lower end of the skill distribution effects are negative but very small. This lends support for the interpretation forwarded above that there is a binding participation constraint for students in the lower part of the ability distribution. High ability students in the low reward group have a first year pass rate that is about 8 percent higher than high ability students in the control group.
The effect of the high reward is even higher and is about 15 percent for the high ability students. Although these latter effects are not significant, it is clear that if there are any effects then these are observed for the high ability students.
Column (2) shows the impact estimates on the number of credit points students achieved by the end of the first year. Here we see that high ability students in the high reward group perform significantly better than high ability students in the control group. The difference is 8 credit points. Low ability students in the high reward group score 6.5 credit points less than their counterpart in the control group. This is at the border of significance at the 10 percent level.
Columns (3) and (4) report the long term effects of the rewards. For low ability students the negative effects of the rewards after one year have been magnified.
After three years, low ability students assigned to the high reward group collected 23 credit points less than low ability students assigned to the control group. This difference is statistically significant. This group also has a 10 percentage points higher dropout rate, although this difference lacks precision. For low ability students assigned to the low reward group the effects after three years are smaller (and insignificant) but go in the same direction. For the high ability students the effects obtained after one year have also increased after three years. High ability students assigned to the high reward group collected almost 30 credit points more than high ability students assigned to the control group. They also have a 26 percentage points lower dropout rate. Both differences are statistically significant. For high ability students assigned to the low reward group effects are smaller and lack precision, but go in the same direction.
We thus find that there is significant heterogeneity in the behavioral response to financial incentives. Low ability students perform worse, and high ability students perform better. These relationships are monotonic over the range of the rewards that were offered. It is possible to interpret these results along the lines of Camerer and Hogarth (1999) . If financial rewards have important displacement effects on intrinsic motivation this can explain a negative relationship between reward (size) and achievement, especially at the bottom of the skill distribution. The performance threshold tied to the reward, can also result in a binding participation constraint (i.e. ceiling effects) at the bottom. This will then result in zero incentive effects for low ability students. Angrist and Lavy (2002) offer a similar explanation when they find no (their first experiment) or only small (their second experiment) average treatment effects. The students in their sample come from a disadvantaged group with very low initial (no reward) pass rates. For students at the higher end of the skill distribution the threshold is feasible and positive incentive effects are observed.
Interestingly, while the experiment only rewarded achievement in the first year, the effects after three years are larger than the effects observed after one year.
The increased negative effect for low ability students could be readily explained if the aforementioned reduction of intrinsic motivation is permanent. The increased positive effect for high ability students cannot be explained by reference to intrinsic motivation. Assuming that for this group the rewards initially also have adverse effects on intrinsic motivation it would require that intrinsic motivation not only reappears but is higher than it would have been in the absence of the financial reward in the first year. One explanation for the increased positive effect for high ability students is that during the year of the experiment, the high ability students in the reward groups experienced that working hard resulted in good exam results, and that this motivated them to continue working hard after the experiment finished.
An alternative explanation for the amplification of the (negative and positive) effects is that being on track after the first year makes studying in subsequent years easier for at least two reasons. First, taking re-exams distracts attention from the regular program. Students who have to do few or no re-exams can follow the standard program and concentrate their attention on fewer courses. Second, students who fail exams may consequently lack the prerequisite knowledge to succesfully complete second (and third) year courses.
Are the effects on achievement consistent with self-reported effort? The last two columns of table 4 reports self-reported effort by treatment/ability interaction.
Although none of these effects are significant, the point estimates are relatively consistent with the results on achievement: low ability students in the treatment groups spent less time studying, whereas high ability students in the treatment groups report that they spent more time on their study. The fact that we do not find significant effects of the rewards on students' self-reported effort is likely to be at least partly due to measurement error in the effort variables. This is also what Kremer et al. (2004) report. They find significantly positive effects of their rewards on observed school attendance, while the effects of reports on self-reported measures of effort (and attitudes towards education) are insignificant.
Threats to validity
While a randomized experiment is often considered the gold standard in research on treatment evaluation (Currie, 2001; Duflo and Kremer, 2003) , it is not without threats to validity of the outcomes. Heckman et al. (1999) and Philipson (2000) have drawn attention to the importance of general equilibrium effects and external treatment effects or spillover effects. In the context of our experiment at least three confounding factors may play a role. First there may be treatment substitution bias. Parents may promise a reward or may supplement the reward if the students are assigned to the control or low reward group. In this case all participants could be confronted with essentially the same treatment and we would most likely find no difference between the original three groups. To investigate whether such responses actually took place, we included in the post-experiment questionnaire a question whether someone else (for instance parents) promised a reward for passing all first year exams. Table 5 reports for each group the shares of students responding affirmative to this question along with the mean values of the size of these supplementary rewards. The table shows that supplementary rewards are fairly uncommon, and that incidence rate and size of such rewards are higher among the high reward group than among the low reward group and the control group. Therefore we expect supplementary rewards to have no impact on our findings.
A second possible confounding factor is that teachers may grade exams differently for students in the reward groups than for students in the control groups.
Although teachers are in principle unaware of the treatment status of their students, students could communicate their status in the hope that teachers will grade their exams more favorably. This seems unlikely for two reasons. First, students from the control group could also claim that they belong to a reward group if this implies that their exam will be graded more favorably. 17 A second and more important reason is that during the first academic year most exams are multiple-choice tests.
Such tests give teachers little leeway to manipulate grades of particular students.
A final possible confounding factor is that if the rewards induce students in the reward groups to work harder, this could spill over to their peers in the control group. We consider it unlikely that spillover effects influenced our findings. 18 The overall pass rate of the students in our experiment is very similar to the pass rates of previous cohorts. Information about student effort from previous cohorts is in line with student effort among the students that participated in the experiment. There is also no change in the composition of the student population in terms of secondary school grades for mathematics.
Conclusion
This paper reports about a randomized social experiment that investigated the effects of financial incentives on undergraduate students' achievement. The target population consists of first year economics and business students at the University of Amsterdam. The students, who were randomized into three reward groups, could earn a reward upon passing all first year exams before the start of their second academic year. In the high reward group the reward was €681 and in the low reward group the reward was €227. Students in the control group could not earn a reward.
For the full sample we find that the rewards have small and non-significant effects on the first year pass rate. There are no effects on the number of achieved credit points by the end of the first year. Further breakdown of these results show that there is significant heterogeneity in the behavioral response to these financial incentives. In particular, high ability students (those with more "capital") have higher pass rates and collect significantly more credit points when assigned to higher reward groups. Low ability students on the other hand appear to achieve less when assigned to higher reward groups. After the first year these effects are only significant for the high ability group, but after three years the size of the effects has increased and is statistically significant for both the low and high ability group.
The average treatment effect is therefore small and non-significant not because the average student is unresponsive to financial incentives, but because it is an average of a positive effect at the upper end of the skill distribution and a negative effect at the bottom.
In a post-experiment questionnaire, we also collected information on students' time allocation and study effort. This additional information gives mixed insights in the whole sample. Stratified by ability grouping self reported effort is broadly consistent with the findings for achievement.
One interpretation of our findings follows Camerer and Hogarth (1999) and emphasizes the importance of the match between the ability of the subject (capital), and how effort translates in achievement (production). The performance threshold tied to the reward can result in a binding participation constraint (i.e. ceiling effects) at the bottom of the ability distribution. This will then result in zero incentive effects for low ability students. If, at the same time, financial rewards have important displacement effects on intrinsic motivation this can explain a negative relationship between reward (size) and achievement for low ability students (for whom the displacement effect dominates the incentive effect), and a positive relation for high ability students (where the incentive effect dominates the displacement effect). This mixing of negative and positive relationships between reward size and achievement for different subgroups can generate non-monotonic relationships between reward size and achievement in the population as in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) .
The experiment was conducted at a Dutch university with a cohort of economics and business students. Like with any other social experiment, the extent to which the results can be generalized to other populations (countries, universities, groups of students, etc.) or treatments is unclear. But our findings have potentially important implications for the design of incentives in education since governments are often not only interested in efficiency, but also in equity. The rewards in our experiment are similar to merit based scholarships: students who pass all first year exams receive a scholarship of €681 (or €227) in the subsequent year. The results presented in this paper suggest that merit scholarships could stimulate high ability students and discourage low ability students. Since ability is positively correlated with social background (parents' education) merit based scholarships can have an adverse effects on equity, a conclusion that has been drawn by Kremer et al. (2004) in the context of a primary school in rural Kenya. 
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